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Petra von Mors te in has presented us w i t h a view of the 
self as constituted by two distinct elements w h i c h can be 
summarised as our existential awareness, the felt compo-
nent of experience w h i c h is strictly private and immediate, 
and, the conceptual t h i n k i n g , that w h i c h is publ i c and the 
basis of language. T h i s dichotomy corresponds roughly to 
the Kant ian one between spontaneity and receptivity. 
Furthermore, just as Kant's dichotomous self engenders 
certain a larming results—things-in-themselves, a restricted 
d o m a i n of knowledge, and so o n , so too, the dichotomies 
out l ined i n the paper before us can issue i n something 
equally, if not more, unfortunate—self-loss and a tragic 
lack of satisfaction. T h i s is because each side has its o w n 
realm and requirements, w i t h the result that the self, i n 
w h i c h both sides reside, is simultaneously tugged, so to 
speak, i n both directions. Language is objective, and so 
l imi ted by concepts. Existential awareness is private and 
immediate. T h e c laims of both cannot be satisfied. T h u s , 
it seems that a l l knowledge, whether of self or of others, 
w i l l be incomplete. Furthermore, a l l autobiography, or 
attempts at c o m m u n i c a t i o n of the innermost self, w i l l be 
frustrated. 
F o l l o w i n g the K a n t i a n model, Petra von Morstein does 
suggest a way out of this d i l e m m a . She posits a faculty of 
intellectual in tu i t ion w h i c h makes possible a perfect 
moment of aesthetic pleasure i n w h i c h the dichotomy is 
healed. 
I have found this paper i n w h i c h von Morstein, seeking 
to quarry the riches of the history of phi losophy, has 
init iated a dialogue w i t h Heidegger, Hegel and mostly 
Kant , a most thought p r o v o k i n g one. Let me, i n the spirit 
of this dialogue, give the briefest sketch of what could be a 
Hegel ian diagnosis and solution. 
Hegel sought to go one better than intellectual in tu i -
t ion, and d i d so by refusing to accept the f inali ty of the 
K a n t i a n dual ism. T h i s rejection involves a theory of self as 
the concrete universal. It is inf ini te ly r ich, but, more 
importantly, dialectically inf ini te . T h e self is the whole 
under the aspect of individual i ty . It is a developing, con-
crete process of reflection out to and back from otherness. 
It is both universal and particular, such that each side 
reciprocally conditions the other. T h u s , just as there is no 
innermost fabric of things that exists apart from the self, so 
too, there is no private self isolated from the publ ic . T h i s is 
argued i n the Phenomenology. T h e p u b l i c and private 
moments are distinct, yet they exist w i t h i n an infinite 
dynamic of ongoing reciprocal determination. M y con-
cepts are condit ioned by my private self, my private self by 
my p u b l i c concepts. T h e whole self is the ongoing unity of 
this process. Autobiography is possible because the whole 
self, the real self, is accessible. T h e strictly private side is an 
abstraction that has no meaning apart from its existence i n 
the dynamic whole. Nevertheless, for a healthy, l i v i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l , there can be no complete, perfect or f inished 
autobiography because the self, driven by the dialectic of 
its two sides, is i n mot ion. T h u s , for the tragedy of expres-
s ion and its remedy i n the perfect moment, I suggest 
instead that there can be no complete moment, noth ing 
perfect i n the sense of being finished. There can, then, be 
no perfect satisfaction. There is pleasure, i n Aristotle's 
understanding of it as that w h i c h accompanies activity. 
T h e self is that unity w h i c h is expressed i n a l l my 
experiences being mine. It is equally an infinitely r ich 
mani fo ld . Both sides are conditioned by the other. Each 
new p u b l i c event must change my existential awareness 
and this awareness must change each and every publ i c 
event. T h u s , at least two kinds of sickness or self-loss can 
be identified. T h e first is the death of the self. It occurs 
when I am no longer open to this process. T h e second is a 
k i n d of memory loss. It is a failure to integrate o ld visions 
into the new self. T h e self must be an infinite accumula-
t ion and can fa l l v ic t im, not only to the tyranny of con-
cepts, but also to the loss of the past self. O f course, the o l d 
self cannot be preserved i n its pristine state, but it must be 
sublated, incorporated. I recently dreamed that I was my 
child-self d i p p i n g my foot into very clear water on a sunny 
m o r n i n g , just as I used to when g r o w i n g u p o n Lake 
H u r o n . T h e n I suddenly changed and said to myself, 
" T h a t is you no longer and that w i l l never happen aga in . " 
I woke u p w i t h a face drenched in tears. T h i s dream points 
to a past mode of receptivity that cannot be repeated, but 
must be appropriated. I do not yet know how, though, and 
perhaps this shows how I, i n part, have lost myself. 
In this commentary, I wished to continue the dialogue. 
Let me conclude by p o i n t i n g out two areas i n w h i c h von 
Morstein's focusing on the self and its element of existen-
t ial awareness might prove f rui t fu l . First, the assertion, 
w i t h w h i c h I agree, that truth must consist, not only i n 
objective verification, but also i n fidelity to felt experience, 
seems to me an effective remedy against the abuses of o u r 
age—overweening scientism, attempts to reduce m i n d to 
brain, humans to machines, and so o n . Second, the 
horizon of analysis i n contemporary moral theory seems to 
be persons and rights. There is a n ineradicable impersonal 
and adversarial qual i ty to these concepts. V o n Morste in 
suggests that we shift the focus to selves and their f lourish-
i n g . T h i s seems to me reminiscent of the Greek n o t i o n of 
arrete or funct ional excellence, and as such suggests new 
partners i n our dialogue. 
Pea Soup 
Y o u lost your husband's face i n a bowl 
of pea soup, when the lentils blocked 
his nose and the green b o u i l l o n folded 
his head i n two, turned his cocked 
smile d o w n w i t h the spoon and left you 
standing at the table, fork armed 
like a knife, warmed 
and ready. 
N o w steady. 
H e w i l l not be harmed 
by any of your quick stirs or a few 
splashes i n the soup to get a molded 
smile, two straight eyes locked 
into you, staring straight from the bottom of the 
b o w l . 
A l i s o n Reed 
Tennessee 
